

**In the Wake of 9/11:
The Effects of Identity Self-Categorization on the Emotional
and Behavioral Tendencies of Individuals**

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by

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Abstract

Within this study we move beyond past research to explore the emotions induced by identity self-categorization and the emergence of behavioral patterns based on these emotions connected to the events of 9/11. The social identity of participants was manipulated to include a broad and a narrow identification of the victimized in-group (American students; Western students) and a broad and a narrow identification of an opposing out-group (hostile Arab nations; hostile foreign nations). It was found that in the most narrow in-group and out-group condition, participants indicated the highest levels of sadness and anger as well as the most support for militaristic policies.

The explanation for these findings rests with the notion that when the specific in-group was made salient (American students), participants were led to categorize themselves within a closely related in-group to the victims of 9/11 about whom they had just been reminded. Consequently, this study supports the notion that identity can be manipulated in a subtle manner that increases emotional reactions and increases the support for certain political policies over others.

Introduction

"This is a fight for freedom. This is a fight to say to the freedom-loving people of the world we will not allow ourselves to be terrorized by somebody who thinks they can hit and hide in some cave somewhere."

~George W. Bush~

The events of September 11th 2001, have dramatically affected the way in which we view our world today. Events, such as the terrorism of September 11th, have helped make more prominent the rifts among constituents within our global community. Individuals are led and, some argue, manipulated through means of presidential speeches, ad campaigns and television broadcasts to categorize themselves as part of one group, poised against another. Over the past five years, since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, George W. Bush has constantly referred to freedom-loving nations and freedom-loving people when speaking of those who were attacked on September 11th, in efforts to rally this nation against terrorism. Ironically, Osama Bin Laden has also used similar tactics in his video messages, stating that the Islamic world and abiding Muslims should condemn the policies of the United States.

Research suggests that the rhetoric used in these broadcasts may lead individuals to self-categorize, or endorse one specific identity over another (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus & Gordijn, 2003). In fact, individuals may view themselves as more or less related to the victims of 9/11 depending upon the specific social mapping such messages establish (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus & Gordijn, 2003). Though the notion of self-categorization alone is noteworthy, within this experiment we move beyond past research to explore the emotions induced by identity self-categorization and the emergence of behavioral patterns based on these emotions connected to the events of 9/11.

Throughout history, societal divisions have encouraged the formations of various group memberships and identities. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) draws upon the assumption that individuals are motivated to protect the identity and integrity of their in-group. Membership in a given group consequently elicits specific patterns in the way group members think, perceive the world around them, feel, and behave (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1991). Appraisal theories of emotions propose that specific situational configurations, as appraised by an individual, can activate specific emotions (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Scherer, 1988). The interpretation of these situational configurations is thought to rely on the situation's perceived favorableness with regard to the individual's group's goals and the presence of coping resources. Consequently, group members' appraisals can lead to the activation of specific emotions and result in the elicitation of corresponding behavioral tendencies and behaviors (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus & Gordijn, 2003).

There has been considerable documentation regarding how variations in in-group membership can activate differing behavioral and emotional responses towards an out-group (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus & Gordijn, 2003; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small & Fischhoff, 2003). However, research has not yet focused on whether certain out-groups are more likely to elicit specific emotional and behavioral responses from in-group members than others. To illustrate, Mackie, Devos and Smith (2000) conceptualized this notion through a manipulation of the salience and social support of individuals' in-groups. They were able to demonstrate that inter-group anger is distinguishable from inter-group fear. Consequently, they concluded that the tendency to approach or act against an out-group could be distinguished from the tendency to avoid the group. In accordance with the goals of this experiment, E.R. Smith (1993, 1999)

suggested that events that harm or favor the individual's group, such as the events of 9/11, could trigger these group-based emotions.

The Present Research

Utilizing the actual events of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the present study aims to recreate the possible self-categorizations and consequent emotional and behavioral effects that can occur after a terrorist attack. Specifically, this study targets the emotions of sadness, anger and fear. Prior research suggests that sadness is an emotion triggered when aspects of an event appear to be unexpected –though there is a high level of certainty regarding the losses and harmfulness of the situation at hand. Anger, on the other hand, is activated at times when a situation is appraised to be unfair and when the perceivers are in a position in which they are able to act out against the situation. Fear tends to emerge when individuals experience a high level of uncertainty, and when the perceiver feels that they have little or no control over the situation (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus & Gordijn, 2003).

Self-categorization theorists suggest that there is flexibility to the categorization processes and that social identity itself is inherently context dependent (Abrams, 1999; Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus & Gordijn, 2003). In this regard, it is predicted that variations in self-categorization may produce differences in the emotional and behavioral tendencies elicited in individuals. In one recent study, individuals categorized within a victimized in-group were more likely to experience emotions that resembled those experienced by the victims themselves (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus and Gordijn, 2003). In the scenario of 9/11, individuals seeing themselves as closely related to American victims are likely to experience emotions of sadness, fear and anger at very high levels. Further, a differing pattern of group-emotion emerges among those who are high identifiers within a specific group as opposed to those who are low identifiers

(Yzerbyt et. all, in press). High identifiers who were categorized in the victimized in-group tended to experience more anger than those who expressed a lower level of identification (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus & Gordijn, 2003). Fundamentally, this suggests that a manipulation of identity in a manner that allows one to feel more or less close to the individual members of a group can have dramatic effects on the emotions elicited from group members.

Using the appraisal-tendency framework, emotions have been found to trigger specific cognitive appraisals and behavioral patterns in individuals. Lerner and Keltner have done extensive research regarding the specific effects of fear and anger on risk perception (2000; 2001), though the behavioral components of sadness have been much less researched. Within one study, Lerner and Keltner found that fearful people expressed more pessimistic risk estimates and risk-averse choices than angry people, who expressed optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices (2000). The aftermath of September 11th highlights the need to understand how these emotions may affect the choices that political leaders and citizens make within their daily lives. Another study by Lerner, Gonzalez, Small and Fischhoff (2003) explored the implications of fear and anger on the political policy preferences of individuals in the wake of terrorist attacks. Those primed with anger showed support for more punitive policies; by contrast, fear enhanced preferences for conciliatory policies and investment in broadly applicable precautionary measures.

The attacks of September 11th offer a unique opportunity to study the interaction of social identity and appraisal-tendency theories. Research on the role of categorization offers evidence that individuals who categorize victims as part of their in-group experience more dramatic emotions than those who do not (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus & Gordijn, 2003). At the same time, the role of the out-group has been shown to affect the activation of inter-group anger and

fear (E.R. Smith, 1993, 1999; Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000). Further, there is evidence to support the notion that the specific emotions activated can further mediate the behavioral tendencies of individuals (Lerner et. al, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001). For instance, in a situation where an out-group harms an in-group, in-group members report higher levels of anger and offensive action tendencies but not fear and escape action tendencies (Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000).

Approximately five years after the attacks on the World Trade Centers on September 11, 2001 an experiment was conducted to explore how relation to the victimized in-group of the terrorist attacks and relation to an opposing out-group affected individuals' emotional as well as behavioral tendencies. In a preliminary study, a political policy scale was constructed as a dependent measurement to be used within the primary study. The scale contained political policies that factor analysis revealed as "militaristic", "foreign policy and investment abroad," and "domestic or homeland security policies". Within the primary study, individuals' relationships to the victimized in-group and their relationship to an opposing out-group were manipulated. The manipulations included a broad and a narrow identification of the victimized in-group (American students; Western students) and a broad and a narrow identification of the opposing out-group (hostile Arab nations; hostile foreign nations).

It was hypothesized that these manipulations of social identity would have a significant impact on the levels of sadness, anger and fear expressed by participants and the political policies they supported. Individuals within the narrow victimized in-group (American students) and the narrow opposing out-group (hostile Arab nations) condition were expected to endorse a social identity that would lead them to identify strongly with the victims of 9/11 and thus were expected to manifest the highest levels of all three emotions. Furthermore, individuals within the

narrow in-group/out-group condition were expected to indicate the highest support for the militaristic political policies due to relating more to the victims of 9/11 and having the most specific target for their emotions in the categorization of an opposing out-group. Specifically, the hypothesis was that participants within the narrowest in-group/out-group condition would have a higher tendency to feel sad, angry and fearful and subsequently support the militaristic policies at a higher level than any other condition.

Study 1

Method

Overview

Previous research suggests that individuals led to experience sadness, anger or fear will differ in their risk assessments of situations and consequent offensive action tendencies (Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000). Other research also leads us to believe that feeling sad, angry or fearful may trigger specific behavioral components within individuals that cause them to be more or less supportive of certain political policies (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small & Fischhoff, 2003). Research on this topic has not been extensive, and specifically is lacking in the realm of political policies that individuals may support when these emotions are activated. Consequently, a preliminary goal in the present research was to construct a political policy scale of offense seeking policies and defense seeking policies. The scale would then be used within the primary study to distinguish the differing political policies individuals are willing to support when their identity is varied experimentally.

Participants

A total of 72 undergraduate students (35 males, 32 females; 4 missing data) from The Ohio State University volunteered to take part in this study. They provided demographic

information (gender, age, major, political party affiliation, whether they supported the war in Iraq, and whether they were in the U.S. Army).

Procedure

All participants were asked to complete a 45-item questionnaire. They were asked to indicate the degree of defensiveness or offensiveness of a specific political policy on a 21-point scale anchored by –10 (indicating an extremely defensive policy) and +10 (indicating an extremely offensive policy). In the instructions, (see Appendix B), a defensive policy was defined as one that involves an attempt to stop an opposing force from attacking, endangering or creating injury. An offensive policy was defined as a policy that involves an action of attacking, injuring or endangering an opposing force, often through aggressive means.

Results

A factor analysis was performed on the items to examine the structure of the participants' reactions to the political policies. A four-factor structure was obtained using a Quartimax oblique rotation, revealing high communalities across the four different factors. The four-factor solution yielded X^2 (816, N=219) = 1496.32; root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .110; and an expected cross-validation index (ECVI) = 30.00. Only the first three factors of the four-factor structure obtained were interpretable, and so only these were used in the construction of the political policy scale. Only items loading above .40 were included (see Table 1).

The first factor on the four-factor structure included ten items loading (.417 to .792), the second factor included fourteen items loading (.430 to .848), and the third factor included eight items loading (.450 to .748). As can be seen in Table 1, the first factor included items reflecting militaristic actions, the second factor included items reflecting foreign policy and intervention abroad actions, and the third factor was comprised of items defined as domestic intervention and

homeland security policies. The three political policy sub-scales were constructed from the items loading on each of these three interpretable factors.

Study 2

Method

Overview

To test the hypothesis that the broad versus narrow social identity in the scenario of 9/11, (in-group and out-group), will influence affect (sadness, anger and fear) expressed by participants and their support of political policies, we experimentally manipulated the reference points participants were instructed to use to assess their in-group and opposing out-group categorization. Participants were randomly assigned to four conditions.

In a factorial experimental design, half the participants were primed to consider their in-group as American students, half as Western students. For the out-group manipulation, half were instructed to consider student respondents from hostile Arab nations and half were told to consider students from hostile foreign nations. This design yielded from conditions in which participants were either broad or narrow in in-group identity and either broad or narrow in out-group identity. Participants were then asked to assess their current states of emotions with regard to sadness, anger, fear and calmness (as the control) on a 9-point scale. They were also then asked to indicate their level of support for 32 political policies (including only those items retained from the factor analysis) on a 5-point scale. The policies were categorized as militaristic, foreign policy and investment abroad, and domestic investment/homeland security policies.

Participants

Sixty-eight participants (46 females, 22 males) were recruited from a psychology class at the Ohio State University and received extra credit for participating.

Procedure

The experiment was conducted in a 2 (In-group) x 2 (Out-group) experimental study design (see Table 2). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions with 17 participants in each of the four conditions yielded from the factorial design.

Participants were first asked to recall the events that took place on September 11th, 2001, and were then shown a small video clip documenting a CNN news broadcast on the day of the September 11th attacks. The video contained graphic images of the victims of the attacks and an image of the 2nd plane crashing into the World Trade Center towers. The purpose of the video was inspire as much of the emotion on the day of the actual attacks as possible, and participants were instructed to try to transport themselves back in time to that moment and to try to experience seeing the video as they had experienced that day.

The Manipulation

After viewing the video, participants were asked to answer an accompanying questionnaire packet, which opened with the identity manipulation then presented two categories of dependent measures. Within the first line of the questionnaire, participants were primed with a statement (reflecting the condition to which they were randomly assigned) that stated that the views of one of the in-group conditions would be compared with views of one of the out-group conditions. For example, participants in the “narrow-narrow” identity condition were given a survey that stated that the study was comparing the views of American students with the views of

students within hostile Arab nations. Consequently, participants were expected to identify with Americans as their in-group and hostile Arab nations as their out-group within this condition, as they began to complete their questionnaire. The four combinations of instructions (e.g. “narrow-narrow”, “broad-narrow”, etc.) can be found in Appendix C.

Dependent Measurements

After viewing the video and reading the prime, participants were then asked to report their immediate feelings using a 9-point rating scale anchored by 1 (absolutely not) to 9 (absolutely). Two items assessed fear-related feelings (frightened, threatened), two reflected anger-related feelings (angry, furious), two reflected sadness-related feelings (sad, sorrowful), and finally two reflected calmness-related feelings (calm, optimistic), (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus & Gordijn, 2003). These eight items created the dependent measure for emotions (see Appendix D).

The second dependent measure was the political policy scale. Participants were asked to indicate their level of support for 32 political policies using a 5-point rating scale anchored by 1 (absolutely not) to 5 (absolutely). Of these policies ten reflected a militaristic approach to diplomacy (see Table 3). For instance, two of these items were, “Deploy military troops to “hot beds” of terrorist activity” and “Bomb any active military and nuclear sites within countries supporting terrorism.” Fourteen items reflected foreign policy and intervention abroad (see Table 3). For instance, two of these items were, “Place a ban on the export of weaponry and ammunition to all countries supporting terrorism” and “Screen all ships moving in and out of ports within regions supporting terrorism.” Finally, the remaining eight items reflected domestic intervention and homeland security (see Table 3). For instance, two of these items were, “Place quotas on the number of Arabs employed within advanced science and engineering fields within

the U.S.” and “Limit the number of Arabs allowed entrance into the U.S.” Each of these thirty-two items appeared randomly throughout this final questionnaire (see Appendix E).

Results

Participants’ assessments of political policy support for all three political policy factors (militaristic, foreign policy/investment abroad, domestic/homeland security) were submitted to an analysis of variance (ANOVA). Participants’ responses regarding the emotions they felt (sadness, anger, fear, calmness) were also submitted to an ANOVA. Only anger and sadness resulted in an effect. There were no significant main effects or interactions involving gender in any analysis. Consequently, gender was dropped from further consideration.

Emotion

Both sadness and anger resulted in significant main effects. ANOVAs indicated anger as having a significant main effect of in-group identity, $F(1,68)=3.779$, $p<.10$. The item regarding feeling “furious” seemed to account for most of the variance, $F(1,68)=5.256$, $p<.05$, and this item alone was significant. Apriori individual comparisons were conducted because it was anticipated that the narrow in-group identity/narrow out-group identity condition would be most likely to elicit strong emotional reactions. An LSD multiple comparisons analysis provided support for the hypothesis that participants within the narrow in-group/narrow out-group condition ($M=6.41$) had higher levels of anger than those within the broad in-group broad out-group condition ($M=4.94$), $p<.05$ (see Figure 1). The composite measure of sadness revealed a marginally significant in-group main effect, $F(1,68)=2.173$, $p=.15$. The item regarding feeling “sorrowful” appeared to account for most of the variance in this composite measure, $F(1,68)=3.820$, $p<.10$.

Political Policies

For the militaristic policy item, the ANOVA approached significance for the in-group main effect, $F(1,68)=2.183$, $p=.14$ and the in-group/out-group interaction, $F(1,68)=1.679$, $p=.20$. Apriori individual comparisons were again conducted because it was anticipated that the narrow in-group identity/narrow out-group identity condition would be most likely to elicit strong emotional reactions and consequently, strong effects on policy advocacy. Least squares difference (LSD) multiple comparisons for the militaristic policy factor across identity conditions indicated a marginally significant effect ($p<.1$) when comparing the narrow in-group (American) narrow out-group (hostile Arab nations) condition ($M=3.12$) with all other conditions (see Figure 2). As predicted, this suggests that those within the narrow in-group and narrow out-group condition had a higher tendency to support militaristic policies than all other social identity conditions.

For the foreign policy/investment abroad policy factor, a between-subject ANOVA indicated a main-effect approaching significance for the in-group, $F(1,68)=2.270$, $p=.14$. LSD multiple comparisons follow-up analyses for the foreign policy/investment abroad policy factor unexpectedly revealed a marginally significant effect ($p<.1$) when comparing the narrow in-group/narrow out-group condition ($M=4.12$) with the broad in-group (Westerners) broad out-group (hostile foreign nations) condition ($M=3.83$) (see Figure 3). This suggests that those within the narrow in-group/narrow out-group condition have a higher tendency to support foreign policy/intervention abroad policies than those within the broadest in-group/out-group condition.

The homeland security/domestic policy factor was also found to be approaching significance only in the in-group/out-group interaction, $F(1,68)=1.675$, $p=.20$. However, the

LSD multiple comparisons analysis did not reveal any significant differences across identity conditions for this particular policy factor.

To further explore the impact of social identity on policy advocacy, univariate analyses were conducted on each item comprising the public policy factor. Within the militaristic policies, analysis of item 2 (see Figure 4) revealed a significant main effect of in-group, $F(1, 68)=6.664$, $p<.05$, while item 29 (see Figure 5) revealed a marginally significant in-group main effect, $F(1, 68)=3.089$, $p<.10$. For the in-group/out-group interaction, item 15 (see Figure 6) indicated a marginally significant effect, $F(1, 68)=3.341$, $p<.10$.

Within the foreign policy/investment abroad policy factor, analysis of item 8 (see Figure 7) and 18 (see Figure 8) revealed marginally significant main effects, $F(1, 68)=3.933$, $p<.1$ and $F(1, 68)=2.969$, $p<.1$ respectively. Item 1 (see Figure 9) revealed a marginally significant out-group main effect, $F(1, 68)=2.834$, $p<.10$. For the domestic/homeland security policies, only item 7 (see Figure 10) revealed a significant in-group main effect, $F(1, 68)=5.065$, $p<.05$.

General Discussion

There were two main goals of this research. The first goal was an analysis of the impact of social identity on emotion –specifically feelings of sadness, anger and fear. The second goal was to explore the relationship between identity and the behavioral tendencies of individuals. The research conducted used the events of 9/11, a historical event intended to catalyze the reactions of participants and provide answers to questions regarding how individuals respond to terrorist attacks. Analysis of behavior was conducted through a questionnaire asking participants to indicate their level of support for three categories of political policies including militaristic, foreign policy/intervention abroad and domestic homeland security policies. Primarily, the hypothesis was made that participants within the narrowest in-group/out-group condition would

have a higher tendency to feel sad, angry and fearful and subsequently support the militaristic policies at a higher level than any other condition.

Although participants were expected to indicate high levels of sadness, anger and fear in the narrow in-group/out-group condition, only high significant effects of sadness and anger were found for individuals within the in-group condition. The lack of a significant main effect of fear suggests that this particular emotion may only arise in very specific situational configurations. In one study, Mackie et al. (2000) created a scenario in which participants' in-group was harmed by an opposing out-group and there was little collective support. Although the hypothesis for the experiment was that appraisal of the situation would elicit group-based fear, the data failed to support the prediction. Even in a study by Dumont et. al (2003) resembling our present experiment, taking place one week after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, data collected indicated only moderate levels of fear. This leads to the notion that fear may have an immediacy effect, where it is an automatic emotion that does not linger after the occurrence of a particular event to the extent that sadness and anger do. Even the presence of significant effects for anger and sadness is a remarkable occurrence, considering the weak manipulation of identity introduced within the study.

The out-group manipulation seemed to have little impact on the emotional state of participants. Throughout all the analyses, the state of the in-group had a greater effect on both the emotional and behavioral tendencies of participants. These findings are consistent with previous research suggesting that the collectivity or support from the in-group alone can result in distinctly different emotions towards an opposing out-group. One study, manipulating the perceived strength of opposing in-groups and out-groups, found that when membership in a group experiencing a value conflict with another group was made salient, participants showed

greater identification with the in-group than with the out-group (Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000). Moreover, this supports the possibility that relation to the in-group dominates identity and simply carries more impact than subtle manipulations to the out-group. Of course, it is possible that if the out-group were more salient, without an in-group manipulation conjoined, results for the out-group conditions would have been stronger. It is also possible that the identity manipulation for the out-group was weaker than that of the in-group and the choice of out-groups simply did not carry any psychological distinction for participants.

As expected, participants within the narrowest in-group/out-group condition seemed to indicate higher levels of emotion as well as support of policies than those within any other condition. Specifically, they had a greater tendency to support both militaristic and foreign policy/intervention abroad policies than any other condition. The explanation for these findings rests with the notion that when the specific in-group was made salient, (American students), this led participants to categorize themselves within a closely related in-group to the victims of 9/11 about whom they had just been reminded. Furthermore, the mention of Arabs in the out-group category may have solidified this categorization and generated additional clarity to participants' in-group identity.

This study took place five years after the September 11th attacks, at a time in which Americans are dealing with the controversy of a complex, and some believe unjust, war in Iraq. Too, there have not been any terrorist attacks on our soil since. Consequently, participants may have become highly desensitized to the events of 9/11 and the consequent categorizations of in-group/out-group status. In light of this, it is particularly notable that there emerged any significant effects within these data at all. Too, the study was conducted in an uncontrolled environment with a relatively small number of participants in each condition. It is possible that

stronger results would have been obtained in a controlled experimental setting and with a larger number of participants in each condition.

This study confirms previous research suggesting that the salience of group membership and the manner in which situations are appraised can lead to differing emotional and behavioral tendencies in individuals. Additionally, this study gives insight into the variables that are involved in creating an atmosphere that makes an individual more or less likely to support a militaristic policy versus a policy that requires foreign or solely domestic intervention. In a political realm that is becoming increasingly more volatile and controversial, the extent to which individuals are willing to support certain acts has become a question of high priority. Using an event such as 9/11 allows us ascertain real-life scenarios and gives us information regarding how individuals may react to such situations in the future.

An extension of this research, in a setting that is more controlled, can give us more detailed information regarding how the mechanisms of identity and emotion interact to create behavioral patterns within individuals. Also, research on the effects of out-group and in-group categorization can be analyzed using more real-life scenarios in order to create a more applicable and generalized setting for observing human behavior. Patterns that can be detected utilizing real-life events can help researchers further understand the complexities that arise in behavioral patterns of individuals.

Moreover, this study reveals the sensitivity of social identity and supports the notion that identity can be manipulated in a subtle manner that increases emotion and increases the support of certain political policies over others. Consequently, this supports the notion that the rhetoric used in broadcasts and within the media may lead individuals to endorse one specific identity over another and ultimately have an effect on the emotional and behavioral tendencies of

individuals. Individuals may benefit from this knowledge through an increased awareness of the general mechanisms utilized by political figures and within the media that may, in turn, affect the critical decisions they make within their daily lives.

Appendix A

Table 1 – Factor Analysis Political Policy Item Loadings

Item -Political Policy	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Deploy military troops to “hot beds” of terrorist activity	0.679	0.034	-0.214
Bomb any active military and nuclear sites within countries supporting terrorism	0.575	-0.062	-0.108
Bomb areas in which terrorists can recruit and train members	0.663	-0.023	-0.167
Dismantle the terrorist network through the capture and killing of intermediate leaders	0.592	-0.021	-0.27
Interrogate all suspected terrorists through any means necessary	0.417	-0.001	0.231
Launch bombing campaigns in territories that may harbor suspected terrorists	0.765	-0.041	-0.099
Implement air raids on Middle Eastern nations suspect of harboring terrorists	0.792	-0.121	0.005
Remove regimes that support terrorism through military operations	0.67	0.229	-0.013
Assassinate suspected terrorist leaders through military coup	0.679	0.043	-0.019
Increase support for the annihilation of Arab nations	0.538	-0.017	0.118
Place a ban on the export of weaponry and ammunition to all countries supporting terrorism	0.148	0.569	0.199
Screen all ships moving in and out of ports within regions supporting terrorism	-0.096	0.467	-0.033
Restrict the funding of terrorist organizations	0.078	0.624	0.18
Monitor domestic phone calls of suspected terrorists	-0.058	0.433	0.431
Assist and bolster the counter terrorism capabilities of countries working with the U.S.	0.052	0.43	-0.117
Expand and improve U.S. intelligence capabilities abroad	-0.076	0.655	-0.187
Place economic sanctions on nations that are sympathetic to terrorist activity	0.154	0.848	0.045
Arrange a forum with leaders of Arab nations to work on strengthening diplomatic relations	-0.198	0.772	-0.181
Expand and improve US intelligence capabilities at home	-0.373	0.562	-0.008
Restrict the export of goods to nations within the Middle East	-0.039	0.461	0.407
Give funding incentives to Arab nations that are following U.S. counter-terrorist policies	-0.253	0.467	-0.155
Decrease U.S. dependence on foreign oil	-0.094	0.479	0.018
Monitor research and technology ventures within the Middle East	0.03	0.557	0.144
Improve the image of Americans within the Middle East	0.145	0.442	-0.008
Place quotas on the number of Arabs employed within advanced science and engineering fields within the U.S.	-0.12	0.027	0.772
Limit the number of Arabs allowed entrance into the U.S.	-0.0123	0.065	0.691
Initiate complete background searches on Arabs earning higher degrees in the U.S.	-0.116	0.033	0.784
Exclude Arabs within the U.S. from entrance into specific public and governmental venues	-0.241	-0.038	0.701
Confine Arabs within the U.S. to secure and militarized zones	0.091	-0.058	0.727
Prohibit Arabs from entering the U.S.	0.027	-0.055	0.726
Support the degradation of Arabs in the media	0.245	-0.183	0.523
Disengage from foreign policy intervention within the Middle East	-0.18	-0.117	0.45

*Loadings in bold indicate items loading strongest on a particular factor

Table 2 –Study Design 2 (In-group) x 2 (Out-group)

		In-group	
		Narrow	Broad
Out-group	Narrow	American students vs. students w/in hostile Arab nations	Western Students vs. students w/in hostile Arab nations
	Broad	American students vs. students w/in hostile foreign nations	Western Students vs. students w/in hostile foreign nations

Table 3 –Means of Support Levels of Policy Items across Conditions

**Factor	Item - Political Policy	*Condition 1	*Condition 2	*Condition 3	*Condition 4
1	Deploy military troops to “hot beds” of terrorist activity	3.47	3	2.65	3.47
1	Bomb any active military and nuclear sites within countries supporting terrorism	3.06	2.24	2.47	2.35
1	Bomb areas in which terrorists can recruit and train members	3.06	2.29	2.24	2.35
1	Dismantle the terrorist network through the capture and killing of intermediate leaders	3.71	3.12	3.29	3.47
1	Interrogate all suspected terrorists through any means necessary	3.59	3.06	2.71	2.88
1	Launch bombing campaigns in territories that may harbor suspected terrorists	2.65	2.18	2	1.88
1	Implement air raids on Middle Eastern nations suspect of harboring terrorists	2.76	2.35	2.24	2.18
1	Remove regimes that support terrorism through military operations	3.76	3.18	3.06	3.53
1	Assassinate suspected terrorist leaders through military coup	3	2.24	2.59	2.35
1	Increase support for the annihilation of Arab nations	2	1.65	1.59	1.24
2	Place a ban on the export of weaponry and ammunition to all countries supporting terrorism	4.71	3.94	4.18	4.06
2	Screen all ships moving in and out of ports within regions supporting terrorism	4.53	4.06	3.88	4.24
2	Restrict the funding of terrorist organizations	4.88	4.59	4.65	4.94
2	Monitor domestic phone calls of suspected terrorists	4.06	3.47	3.47	3.47
2	Assist and bolster the counter terrorism capabilities of countries working with the U.S.	4	3.71	4	3.82
2	Expand and improve U.S. intelligence capabilities abroad	4.76	4.41	4.65	4.53
2	Place economic sanctions on nations that are sympathetic to terrorist activity	3.47	3.06	3.41	3.18
2	Arrange a forum with leaders of Arab nations to work on strengthening diplomatic relations	4.35	4.41	4.24	4.47
2	Expand and improve US intelligence capabilities at home	4.82	4.41	4.53	4.65
2	Restrict the export of goods to nations within the Middle East	2.41	2.35	2.06	1.94
2	Give funding incentives to Arab nations that are following U.S. counter-terrorist policies	3.47	3.56	3.41	3.47
2	Decrease U.S. dependence on foreign oil	4.29	4.12	4.53	4.53
2	Monitor research and technology ventures within the Middle East	3.53	3.35	3.53	3.41
2	Improve the image of Americans within the Middle East	4.18	4.18	3.94	4.59

3	Place quotas on the number of Arabs employed within advanced science and engineering fields within the U.S.	2.18	1.71	1.59	2
3	Limit the number of Arabs allowed entrance into the U.S.	2.41	2	1.76	1.88
3	Initiate complete background searches on Arabs earning higher degrees in the U.S.	3.12	2.24	2.24	3
3	Exclude Arabs within the U.S. from entrance into specific public and governmental venues	2.12	2.06	1.65	1.76
3	Confine Arabs within the U.S. to secure and militarized zones	1.82	1.71	1.35	1.35
3	Prohibit Arabs from entering the U.S.	1.76	1.53	1.29	1.29
3	Support the degradation of Arabs in the media	1.41	1.53	1.53	1.29
3	Disengage from foreign policy intervention within the Middle East	2	2.63	2.59	1.59

*Condition 1 –Narrow In-group/Narrow Out-group
Condition 2 –Broad In-group/Broad Out-group
Condition 3 –Narrow In-group/Broad Out-group
Condition 4 –Broad In-group/Broad Out-group

**Factor 1 –Militaristic Policies
Factor 2 –Foreign Policy/Intervention Abroad
Factor 3 –Domestic Policy/Homeland Security

Figure 1




Figure 2

Estimated Marginal Means of Factor 1 – Militaristic Policies




Figure 3

**Estimated Marginal Means of Factor 2- Foreign Policy/
Intervention Abroad**




Figure 4

**Estimated Marginal Means of Q:2 –
“Deploy military troops to “hot beds” of terrorist activity”**




Figure 5

**Estimated Marginal Means of Q:29 –
“Remove regimes that support terrorism through military operations”**




Figure 6

**Estimated Marginal Means of Q:15 –
“Launch bombing campaigns in territories that may harbor suspected terrorists”**




Figure 7

**Estimated Marginal Means of Q:8 –
“Restrict the funding of terrorist organizations”**




Figure 8




Figure 9

**Estimated Marginal Means of Q:1 –
“Place a ban on the export of weaponry and ammunition to all
countries supporting terrorism”**





Figure 10

**Estimated Marginal Means of Q:7 –
“Initiate complete background searches on Arabs earning higher
degrees in the U.S.”**



Appendix B

Proposed U.S. Policies Toward Counter-Terrorist Attacks OFFENSE/DEFENSE Scale

Rate the following 45 proposed U.S. Policies toward Counter-Terrorism as either Offensive or Defensive. The policies are to be rated on a 21-point scale, with end-points of -10 (Extremely Offensive) to 10 (Extremely Defensive), and all steps in between.

The policies are evaluated by you in terms of their “Offensive” or “Defensive” nature. Please use the following specific definitions of “offensive” and “defensive” to guide your judgments.

Offensive Policy: Involves an action of attacking, injuring, or endangering an opposing force – often through (though not restricted to) aggressive means.

Defensive Policy: Involves an attempt to stop an opposing force from attacking, endangering, or creating injury –to repel the opposing force.

For example, Nation A considers Nation B an opposing force. Nation A could endorse a policy that secures and seals off its national borders. This would be a Defensive Policy. Another reaction might be to “fight Nation B over there,” and try to root out the enemy where they live. This would be an Offensive Policy.

Please use the following scale to answer each item by circling your response:

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately					Neutral					Moderately				Extremely		
Defensive				Defensive										Offensive				Offensive		
Policy																		Policy		

Please do not rush through these assessments. Please do not focus on your personal opinions. And please do not consider the feasibility of these policies. Please focus solely on the *offensive* and *defensive* aspects of each policy and rate each one accordingly.

1)

Place a ban on the export of weaponry and ammunition
to all countries supporting terrorism

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

2)

Deploy military troops to "hot beds" of terrorist activity

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

3)

Bomb any active military and nuclear sites within countries supporting terrorism

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

4)

Place quotas on the number of Arabs employed within advanced science and engineering fields within the U.S.

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

5)

Screen all ships moving in and out of ports within regions supporting terrorism

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

6)

Limit the number of Arabs allowed entrance into the U.S.

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
------------	-----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	------------

Extremely Defensive Policy	Moderately Defensive	Neutral	Moderately Offensive	Extremely Offensive Policy
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7)

Initiate complete background searches on Arabs earning higher degrees in the U.S.

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10	
Extremely Defensive Policy				Moderately Defensive					Neutral					Moderately Offensive					Extremely Offensive Policy		

8)

Restrict the funding of terrorist organizations

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10	
Extremely Defensive Policy				Moderately Defensive					Neutral					Moderately Offensive					Extremely Offensive Policy		

9)

Monitor domestic phone calls of suspected terrorists

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10	
Extremely Defensive Policy				Moderately Defensive					Neutral					Moderately Offensive					Extremely Offensive Policy		

10)

Apprehend and incarcerate all suspected terrorists

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10	
Extremely Defensive Policy				Moderately Defensive					Neutral					Moderately Offensive					Extremely Offensive Policy		

11)

Bomb areas in which terrorists can recruit and train members

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10	
Extremely Defensive Policy				Moderately Defensive					Neutral					Moderately Offensive					Extremely Offensive Policy		

12)

Dismantle the terrorist network through the capture and killing of intermediate leaders

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

13)

Assist and bolster the counter terrorism capabilities of countries working with the U.S.

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

14)

Interrogate all suspected terrorists through any means necessary

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

15)

Expand and improve U.S. intelligence capabilities abroad

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

16)

Launch bombing campaigns in territories that may harbor suspected terrorists

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

17)

Place economic sanctions on nations that are sympathetic to terrorist activity

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				

Defensive Policy	Defensive		Offensive	Offensive Policy
---------------------	-----------	--	-----------	---------------------

- 18) Arrange a forum with leaders of Arab nations to work on strengthening diplomatic relations

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely Defensive Policy				Moderately Defensive					Neutral					Moderately Offensive				Extremely Offensive Policy		

- 19) Expand and improve US intelligence capabilities at home

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely Defensive Policy				Moderately Defensive					Neutral					Moderately Offensive				Extremely Offensive Policy		

- 20) Exclude Arabs within the U.S. from entrance into specific public and governmental venues

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely Defensive Policy				Moderately Defensive					Neutral					Moderately Offensive				Extremely Offensive Policy		

- 21) Place air marshals on all planes leaving from and entering the U.S.

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely Defensive Policy				Moderately Defensive					Neutral					Moderately Offensive				Extremely Offensive Policy		

- 22) Encourage discussion forums that allow the interaction of Arab and American students

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely Defensive Policy				Moderately Defensive					Neutral					Moderately Offensive				Extremely Offensive Policy		

- 23) Deploy a nuclear bomb in the Middle East

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

24)

Place an emphasis on cultural awareness in educational systems across the U.S.

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

25)

Remove U.S. troops from all territories within the Middle East

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

26)

Restrict the export of goods to nations within the Middle East

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

27)

Confine Arabs within the U.S. to secure and militarized zones

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

28)

Give funding incentives to Arab nations that are following U.S. counter-terrorist policies

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

29)

Prohibit U.S. citizens from travel to any nation suspected of harboring terrorists

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately					Neutral					Moderately				Extremely		
Defensive				Defensive										Offensive				Offensive		
Policy																		Policy		

30)

Prohibit Arabs from entering the U.S.

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately					Neutral					Moderately				Extremely		
Defensive				Defensive										Offensive				Offensive		
Policy																		Policy		

31)

Support the degradation of Arabs in the media

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately					Neutral					Moderately				Extremely		
Defensive				Defensive										Offensive				Offensive		
Policy																		Policy		

32)

Reject the auspices of the Geneva Convention for all P.O.Ws suspected of terrorist activity

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately					Neutral					Moderately				Extremely		
Defensive				Defensive										Offensive				Offensive		
Policy																		Policy		

33)

Utilize the UN as a forum for fighting terrorism

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately					Neutral					Moderately				Extremely		
Defensive				Defensive										Offensive				Offensive		
Policy																		Policy		

34)

Increase the deployment of military personnel to secure US borders

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately					Neutral					Moderately				Extremely		
Defensive				Defensive										Offensive				Offensive		
Policy																		Policy		

35)

Disengage from foreign policy intervention within the Middle East

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

36)

Decrease U.S. dependence on foreign oil

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

37)

Monitor research and technology ventures within the Middle East

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

38)

Implement air raids on Middle Eastern nations suspect of harboring terrorists

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely Defensive Policy				Moderately Defensive				Neutral				Moderately Offensive				Extremely Offensive Policy				

39)

Remove regimes that support terrorism through military operations

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely Defensive Policy				Moderately Defensive				Neutral				Moderately Offensive				Extremely Offensive Policy				

40)

Increase funding for domestic military and security operations

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely Defensive Policy				Moderately Defensive				Neutral				Moderately Offensive				Extremely Offensive Policy				

41)

Create an international armored regime for the purpose of dismantling terrorism

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

42)

Combat terrorists' efforts to use weapons of mass destruction

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

43)

Improve the image of Americans within the Middle East

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

44)

Assassinate suspected terrorist leaders through military coup

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

45)

Increase support for the annihilation of Arab nations

-10	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	+7	+8	+9	+10
Extremely				Moderately				Neutral				Moderately				Extremely				
Defensive				Defensive								Offensive				Offensive				
Policy																Policy				

Please answer the following questions. Answers will be used solely for statistical purposes.

Gender: F or M (Circle one)

Age:

Major:

Political Party Affiliation:

Republican or Democrat (circle one) or Other (please fill in)_____

Do you support the war in Iraq? Y or N (circle one)

Are you in the U.S. Army? Y or N (circle one)

Appendix C

The four instructions sets included at the beginning of each questionnaire:

American Students Vs. Students within Hostile Arab Nations

As part of our study, we will be comparing the views of **American students** with the views of students within **hostile Arab nations**. Please answer the following questions as they are presented to you.

Western Students Vs. Students within Hostile Arab Nations

As part of our study, we will be comparing the views of **Western students** with the views of students within **hostile Arab nations**. Please answer the following questions as they are presented to you.

American Students Vs. Students within Hostile foreign Nations

As part of our study, we will be comparing the views of **American students** with the views of students within **hostile foreign nations**. Please answer the following questions as they are presented to you.

Western Students Vs. Students within Hostile foreign Nations

As part of our study, we will be comparing the views of **Western students** with the views of students within **hostile foreign nations**. Please answer the following questions as they are presented to you.

Appendix D

Emotional Affect Scale

Please use this 9-point rating scale to assess how you are feeling at this moment. Circle your response.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<i>absolutely not</i>								<i>absolutely</i>

1. Are you feeling sad?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<i>absolutely not</i>								<i>absolutely</i>

2. Are you feeling optimistic?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<i>absolutely not</i>								<i>absolutely</i>

3. *Are you feeling furious?*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<i>absolutely not</i>								<i>absolutely</i>

4. *Are you feeling threatened?*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<i>absolutely not</i>								<i>absolutely</i>

5. Are you feeling calm?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<i>absolutely not</i>								<i>absolutely</i>

6. Are you feeling angry?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<i>absolutely not</i>								<i>absolutely</i>

7. *Are you feeling frightened?*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<i>absolutely not</i>								<i>absolutely</i>

8. *Are you feeling sorrowful?*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<i>absolutely not</i>								<i>absolutely</i>

Appendix E

Political Policy Scale (final questionnaire)

A list of public policies that have been proposed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks is included below. Indicate whether or not you would support each political policy by circling your response. Please do not consider the feasibility of these policies and focus solely on whether you would support each proposed policy.

ex. Place a ban on the export of weaponry and ammunition to all countries within the Middle East.

1	2	3	4	5
<i>absolutely not</i>				<i>absolutely</i>

1.

Place a ban on the export of weaponry and ammunition to all countries supporting terrorism

1	2	3	4	5
<i>absolutely not</i>				<i>absolutely</i>

2.

Deploy military troops to “hot beds” of terrorist activity

1	2	3	4	5
<i>absolutely not</i>				<i>absolutely</i>

3.

Bomb any active military and nuclear sites within countries supporting terrorism

1	2	3	4	5
<i>absolutely not</i>				<i>absolutely</i>

4.

Place quotas on the number of Arabs employed within advanced science and engineering fields within the U.S.

1	2	3	4	5
<i>absolutely not</i>				<i>absolutely</i>

5.

Screen all ships moving in and out of ports within regions supporting terrorism

1	2	3	4	5
<i>absolutely not</i>				<i>absolutely</i>

6.

Limit the number of Arabs allowed entrance into the U.S.

1	2	3	4	5
<i>absolutely not</i>				<i>absolutely</i>

7.

Initiate complete background searches on Arabs earning higher degrees in the U.S.

1 2 3 4 5
absolutely not absolutely

8.

Restrict the funding of terrorist organizations

1
absolutely not

2

3

4

5
absolutely

9.

Monitor domestic phone calls of suspected terrorists

1 **2** **3** **4** **5**

absolutely not *absolutely*

10.

Bomb areas in which terrorists can recruit and train members

1 **2** **3** **4** **5**
absolutely not *absolutely*

11.

Dismantle the terrorist network through the capture and killing of intermediate leaders

1 2 3 4 5
absolutely not absolutely

12.

Assist and bolster the counter terrorism capabilities of countries working with the U.S.

1 2 3 4 5
absolutely not absolutely

13. Interrogate all suspected terrorists through any means necessary
- | | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
14. Expand and improve U.S. intelligence capabilities abroad
- | | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
15. Launch bombing campaigns in territories that may harbor suspected terrorists
- | | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
16. Place economic sanctions on nations that are sympathetic to terrorist activity
- | | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
17. Arrange a forum with leaders of Arab nations to work on strengthening diplomatic relations
- | | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
18. Expand and improve US intelligence capabilities at home
- | | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
19. Exclude Arabs within the U.S. from entrance into specific public and governmental venues
- | | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
20. Restrict the export of goods to nations within the Middle East

- | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
21. Confine Arabs within the U.S. to secure and militarized zones
- | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
22. Give funding incentives to Arab nations that are following U.S. counter-terrorist policies
- | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
23. Prohibit Arabs from entering the U.S.
- | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
24. Support the degradation of Arabs in the media
- | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
25. Disengage from foreign policy intervention within the Middle East
- | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
26. Decrease U.S. dependence on foreign oil
- | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |
27. Monitor research and technology ventures within the Middle East
- | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | <i>absolutely not</i> | | | | <i>absolutely</i> |

28.

Implement air raids on Middle Eastern nations suspect of harboring terrorists

1	2	3	4	5
<i>absolutely not</i>				<i>absolutely</i>

29.

Remove regimes that support terrorism through military operations

1	2	3	4	5
<i>absolutely not</i>				<i>absolutely</i>

30.

Improve the image of Americans within the Middle East

1	2	3	4	5
<i>absolutely not</i>				<i>absolutely</i>

31.

Assassinate suspected terrorist leaders through military coup

1	2	3	4	5
<i>absolutely not</i>				<i>absolutely</i>

32.

Increase support for the annihilation of Arab nations

1	2	3	4	5
<i>absolutely not</i>				<i>absolutely</i>

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